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Il n’y a que la Suisse au monde qui présente ce mélange
de la nature sauvage et de l’industrie humaine.
(Rousseau 1959, 1072)
1. Premise
Switzerland, by virtue of its federalist system,1 is often cited by scholars as
a “successful” instance of the organisation of a multilingual and “multi-
cultural” society by the State (Habermas 1992; Sciarini et al. 2001).
* This article, written by Flora Di Donato, has been added to by Prof. Pascal Mahon. His
additions concern the “naturalisation procedure” (sec. 4). He also corrected and carried out
a critical review of the text. This research was made possible by a “Free Exchange”
scholarship within the framework of the CNR/FNRS (n. 83I-068603) Agreement on scientific
cooperation (May–July 2002) at the Institut de Psychologie de l’Université di Neuchâtel-CH.
Readers are informed that the research was carried out in 2002–4 and that since then some
parts of the Swiss legal system have been changed.
** I am grateful to Prof. Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont for welcoming me to her Institute and
for the research tools she helped me to acquire. I am also grateful to Prof. Pascal Mahon for
his help, interest, and fruitful exchanges on topics of common interest.
1 “The goal and principle of the federalist formula is to preserve any particular characteristics,
and political or cultural autonomies, and to do so through a strong, but circumscribed union
[. . .]: stronger than the sum of its parts, but strictly limited by the contract freely subscribed
to by its members” (De Rougemont 1965, 11).
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In effect, “diversity,” which was legally sanctioned when the Federal
State came into being in 1848, constitutes “a basic element of the collective
identity for each Swiss citizen” (Borghi 1993). “Plurality” is also the result
of various waves of migration to Switzerland—leading to the coming
together of different cultural and legal systems. Sometimes these have been
extremely divergent, and have brought about the search for more or less
explicit forms of mutual adjustment.
Basically speaking, the identity and unity of this “unique” State in the
wider European geographic context are based on plurality (political, legal,
cultural, linguistic). “Switzerland is not a nation formed by nature, but a
nation founded on the shared will of its inhabitants.”2
However, as we shall see, opinions from various quarters shed some
doubt on the existence of a true “Swiss identity” and even upon the
concept of Switzerland being a “successful” society in terms of the
political/legal integration of non-nationals.
2. Cultural Pluralism and National Identity
In 1983 the Federal Council set up the Swiss National Fund for Scientific
Research (FNRS), a national research programme on the subject of
“Pluralisme culturel et de l’identité nationale,” whose aim was to design a
policy to support cultural and linguistic diversity in Switzerland. On this,
Pierre Centlivres remarks that
[t]he wording of the programme immediately made use of a paradox: [. . .] The
expression “the Swiss nation” is almost absent from the political vocabulary after
the ebb of the great republican and radical wave of the last century, so that the
Swiss system seems to be based precisely on political and cultural pluralism.
(Centlivres 1990a, 135)3
For the author, then, the term “nation” may well be nothing more than a
harking back to the unitary Helvetic Republic, established along French
lines after occupation by Directory troops in 1798.
Later on, in 1848, the first federal Constitution was enacted (after a short
civil war—the “Sonderbund” war—following which the liberal cantons
asserted themselves over the conservative Catholic cantons). The federal
Constitution set out the organisation of the State as it is now, based on the
2 Federal Advisory Committee Report on the Question of Foreigners, 1979 (“La Suisse n’est
pas une nation formée par la nature mais il s’agit d’une nation fondée sur une volonté
commune de ses habitants”).
3 “[L]’énoncé du programme fit d’emblée figure de paradoxe: [. . .] l’expression ‘la nation
suisse’ est quasi absente du vocabulaire politique depuis le reflux de la grande vague
républicaine et radicale du siècle passé, alors que le système suisse semble fondé justement
sur le pluralisme politique et culturel.”
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principle of the separation of powers and a two-chamber parliamentary
system to maintain the balance between centralist and federalist forces.
This approach, however, does not take into account the elements which
a collective identity is normally based on, such as a national language, a
common culture, and ethnic uniformity. The emphasis is more on the
identity of individual cantons, rather than on a national identity. It is no
coincidence that the Institute of Ethnology at the Université de Neuchâtel
carries out specific studies on the identity of the individual regions (Rapport
de synthèse de l’Institut d’Ethnologie à propos du PNR. Problèmes régionaux 5.1:
identité régionale, Neuchâtel, 1981). This report highlights the paradoxical
contrast between the goals of the Programme, i.e., reducing the differences
between regions, and the “regionalist” project, designed to maintain
identity-linked cultural differences, and supported by the ethnologists.
From the ethnological point of view, reducing differences would undoubt-
edly result in a weakened sense of belonging.
Approaches (Federal Advisory Committee Report on the Question of
Foreigners) stressing the idea of a specific Swiss culture have not, however,
been lacking.
Such approaches, while acknowledging the specificity and diversity of
the geographic and cultural areas which make up Switzerland, also high-
light a sort of shared identity. In reality, starting from the assumption that
every People, understood as “a community of persons making up a State,”
has its own cultural characteristics, i.e., its own mindset, character, way of
life, and—as a rule—common language, one might well conclude that
Switzerland, whose population includes four regional groups, each with its
own language, mindset, way of life, and specific culture, does not have a
cultural identity of its own. However, from the way in which the “Swiss”
relate to the State, society, and the world of work, it is clear that there are
important shared elements, common traits indicative of a specific “way of
life”—in other words, cultural uniformity.
Thus, despite the specific characteristics peculiar to, and present at all
levels of the Swiss social and institutional structure, it is easy to see that
the citizens of all the cantons have some sense of belonging “to Switzerland.”
This is what Kohler defined in the 1930s as a spiritual imprint: “True Swiss
culture is characterised by a particular imprint which is certainly not
natural (ethnic) but which is defined spiritually. The basis of all Swiss
culture is ‘law’; its object is fulfilment in serving the State. There are some
non-natural preliminary conditions (neither race, nor language, etc.) which
have acted, above all, as a living force within the State. [. . .] The life of the
State and cultural life are the two equal parts making up Swiss unity; the
State is culture, and the main theme of our culture is accepted as being, in
turn, the State” (B. Mayr von Baldegg, quoted in Kohler 1937, 55).
A well-defined national solidarity seems to prevail over any possible
divergence, or at least this was so up to a certain point in time, if we
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consider that in the late 1970s (Boltanski 1966) important studies showed
widespread agreement among the Swiss French and Swiss Germans on a
number of politically significant topics. However, the results of elections
held over the last 20 years have frequently highlighted a significant
difference of opinion between the two main linguistic and cultural areas of
Switzerland. These occasions showed a certain concern about, and feeling
of a threat to, national unity among Swiss citizens.
It is worth remarking that supporters of the idea of a Swiss culture start
from a preliminary assumption, namely, unity in diversity. This seems to be
a widely held principle, both institutionally and at street level, although
centralist and federalist views continue to compete in the definition of
numerous problems.
More recent studies (Sciarini et al. 2001) show, as mentioned above, that
several scholars even take Switzerland as a successful case of identity
construction in multicultural societies. Despite its cultural and territorial
fragmentation, it would be possible, following this line of thinking, to
identify “a strong sense of common identity at the national level” (ibid.,
57). It is also worth noting that, according to Habermas (1992), the success
of this national identity should not be attributed to a culture with common
origins, or to the State in itself, but rather to what he defines as “consti-
tutional patriotism” (especially when it comes to federalism, direct democ-
racy, and neutrality). This means that it is identification with constitutional
principles, or a political culture, that acts as a common denominator “for
a constitutional patriotism that heightens awareness of the multiplicity and
integration of the different ways of life coexisting in a multicultural
society” (Sciarini et al. 2001, 57). Habermas and other scholars (cf. Howe
1995) even hold Switzerland up as an example for the construction of a
European identity within the European Union.
However, scholars believe that there is a price to pay for the achieve-
ment of such domestic unity, i.e., a tendency to close off to the rest of the
world. “The remarkable success in overcoming cultural differences and in
constructing a national identity goes hand in hand with exclusionist
attitudes towards the outside world” (Sciarini et al. 2001, 57). So, as
collective identity has grown stronger, exclusionist practices have become
the norm in foreign trade and immigration policies. Sciarini, Hug, and
Dupont (ibid.) state that, to a certain extent, the very neutrality of
Switzerland seems to have been used as a pretext to justify various forms
of protectionism, mainly in the field of agriculture (to guarantee self-
sufficiency and independence from the international markets). However,
this highly decentralised immigration policy (i.e., subject to the choices of
economic actors) is not matched by an adequate political commitment to
fostering integration. All this could well be seen as the product of “con-
stitutional patriotism” which must be defended in order to protect a
sense of national identity.
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3. “Original” and “Derived” Cultural Plurality: Foreigners as Bearers
of Different Cultures
The multicultural identity which has always characterised Switzerland was
further reinforced by waves of migration before and after World War II
(Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Yugoslav, and Turkish workers as well as
asylum-seekers from various countries). The presence of these often large
groups certainly added to the complexity of the socio-cultural reality in
Switzerland. In this respect, Switzerland is an emblematic case. The intrin-
sic multicultural dimension is added to by the multicultural dimension of
immigration. Imported diversities are added to internal differences, in a
sort of multicultural workshop.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, large parts of the Swiss population had a
negative perception of the presence of immigrants. According to later
studies, the situation began to change in the mid-1970s. Gretler and Poglia
remark that:
Increasingly, multi- or pluri-culturalism has come to be recognised as one of the
fundamental givens of our modern societies and, what is more, it is constantly
becoming consolidated. This fundamental objective given is, admittedly, the subject
of heated political controversies regarding subjective attitudes and opinions.
(Gretler and Poglia 1995, 9)4
As early as the 1970s there was an awareness that
Switzerland owes much to the foreign cultures to which it is organically linked, that
it is even a meeting point of three of these cultures and what characterises the
Confederation is precisely that this coming together has not led to confrontation,
but mutual understanding. The same spirit which has allowed Switzerland to let
different cultures co-exist within its borders and foster among them a policy of
cultural exchange might well be a model for the creation of closer relationships
between the Swiss and foreigners—as long as adequate measures are taken to this
end and the corresponding political will is imposed.5
Although this concept was rapidly taken on board within the education
system, where—as the Report states—the “multicultural nature” of the
4 “[D]e plus en plus, la multi-ou pluri-culturalité a été reconnue comme une des données
fondamentales de nos sociétés modernes et, par ailleurs, ne cesse pas de se renforcer. Cette
donnée fondamentale objective, il est vrai, fait l’objet de controverses politiques passionnées
sur le plan des attitudes et des opinions subjectives.”
5 Commission Clottu in Federal Advisory Committee Report on the Question of Foreigners,
1975 (“la Suisse doit beaucoup aux cultures étrangères auxquelles elle est organiquement liée;
qu’elle est même le point de rencontre de trois de ces cultures et que ce qui caractérise la
Confédération c’est justement que cette rencontre n’a pas débouché sur la confrontation, mais
sur la compréhension réciproque. Le même esprit qui a permis à la Suisse de faire coexister
sur son territoire des cultures différentes et d’instaurer entre elles une politique d’échange
culturel pourrait fort bien servir de modèle pour la création de relations plus étroites entre
Suisses et étrangers—à condition que des mesures adéquates soient prises dans ce but et que
la volonté politique correspondante s’impose”).
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Swiss facilitates the acceptance of foreign students’ cultural and linguistic
diversity, there is still concern about more general matters. Interestingly,
the above-mentioned Report makes use of such phrases as:
The population of our country does not have the impression that its languages are
under threat from the presence of foreigners [. . .] overall, the presence of foreigners
is not really a source of worry for the Swiss population and its way of life [. . .]
generally speaking, it appears that the foreigners residing in Switzerland have not
had a negative influence on our political identity.6
Behind their literal meaning, which suggests a positive image of immi-
grants in Switzerland, these phrases indicate a “defensive” view of the
integration process (Swiss languages are not threatened [. . .] the presence of
foreigners does not threaten the Swiss ways of life [. . .] foreigners do not have
a negative influence on our political identity).
As a matter of fact, despite a unanimous acknowledgement of plurality
as enrichment, one cannot unquestioningly assert that the integration
process of immigrants in Switzerland has been the result of mutual
adjustment. As Facchinetti (délégué cantonal aux étrangers du Canton de
Neuchâtel) remarks, “as things stand, the Swiss policy is one of a unilateral
adjustment of foreigners to Switzerland, and we believe a policy of mutual
adjustment should be adopted.”7
4. The “Naturalisation” Procedure
From the legislative standpoint, the shortcoming in terms of mutual
adaptation in the immigrant integration process in Switzerland is con-
firmed by analysing one of the fundamental stages in the integration
process: naturalisation. This way of granting Swiss nationality represents a
particularly complex procedure, a veritable obstacle course: “They [natu-
ralisation procedures] do not bring any right acquired or recognised to the
candidate, and no appeal in the event of failure”8 (Centlivres, 1990a, 136).
6 Federal Advisory Committee Report on the Question of Foreigners, 1975 (“[l]a population
de notre pays n’a pas l’impression que ses langues sont menacées par la présence des
étrangers [. . .] dans l’ensemble la présence des étrangers n’est pas réellement un facteur de
trouble pour la population suisse et son mode de vie [. . .] d’une façon générale il semble
que les étrangers résidant en Suisse n’aient pas eu d’influence négative sur notre iden-
tité politique”).
7 T. Facchinetti, Interview, FSM/SFM. Journal d’information du Forum suisse pour l’étude des
migrations, June 1997.
8 “Elles [les procédures de naturalisation] ne comportent aucun droit acquis ou reconnus au
candidat, aucun recours en cas d’échec.” Cf. Mahon 2003, 353: “The situation on this matter
could change. In fact, following a number of negative decisions made by the populations of
some municipal areas, and judged arbitrary or discriminatory, the commission of political
institutions of the National Council suggests setting up, without awaiting a general revision
of the right to nationality or the reform of the law on the organisation of the judiciary, a route
of appeal at federal level as much against the (federal) decision on authorising naturalisation
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The “conditions” for granting naturalisation are established at two
different levels: the federal level (which sets the minimum requirements)
and the canton-municipal level. The requirements are of two different
kinds: legal-formal (length of stay, residence, a clean criminal record) and
“cultural,” varying from canton to canton (linguistic, historical, and geo-
graphical knowledge).
For example, applicants for naturalisation in the Neuchâtel canton must
satisfy conditions at the two levels mentioned above:
(1) At federal level (Federal Law of 29 September 1952 on the acquisition
and loss of Swiss nationality, FN) conditions are:
• being integrated into the Swiss community;
• being “accoutumé” to the Swiss way of life and customs;
• complying with the Swiss legal system;
• not jeopardising the internal and external security of Switzerland;
(2) at canton level (Law of the Neuchâtel Canton of 7 November 1955 on
the right of citizenship in Neuchâtel) conditions are:
• having sufficient knowledge of the French language;
• having resided in the Canton in the three years preceding the
application for Federal authorisation.
In greater detail, “ordinary” naturalisation is decided on by the canton and
municipal authorities (in compliance with canton and—where applicable—
municipal law) after a federal authority has ascertained that the minimum
requirements of federal law have been met.9 The foreigner, therefore, will
first have to receive “federal authorisation for naturalisation” (Art. 12 II
LN), subject to the above-mentioned requirements, from the federal police
Bureau. The authorisation, which has a three-year validity and is only
applicable to one specific canton, allows the beneficiary to submit an
application to the canton and the municipality, for “naturalisation within
the canton.” This application requires a decision first at canton level, and
then at municipality level (the distribution of jurisdiction between canton
and municipality is established by canton law), a decision which is made
in most cases by the political authorities (legislature, government) or even
by the people, depending on the canton and municipality involved. In the
majority of cases, decisions were not eligible for appeal to the judiciary,10
and this often led to discriminatory actions. A well-known case is the
as against the Canton-level decisions refusing naturalisation.” As a matter of fact, in the
meantime, a resounding judgment of the Federal Court of 9 July 2003 (DTF 129 I 217, A. und
Mitb. gegen Einwohnergemeinde Emmen) recognised the right to appeal for applicants and,
on this matter, upheld their appeal, considering the popular decision which rejected their
naturalisation as discriminatory.
9 For a detailed illustration of the procedure, cf. Mahon 2003, 352–3.
10 Cf. footnote 5.
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decision of the municipality of Emmen of March 12, 2000, which rejected
19 applications by citizens from Eastern European countries, but accepted
four applications by Italian citizens.11
4.1. Cultural Naturalisation or Threat to Identity?
The naturalisation process, in the way it is described, and, in particular, the
“conditions” both at federal and canton level, confirm to some extent the
unilateral requirement for the foreigner to adjust to the Swiss institutions
and way of life. This is what De Rougemont defines as naturaliser culturel-
lement. In contrast with the metaphor of racines, Denis De Rougemont
proposes the image of implantation: an action deliberately chosen by man
rather than the result of his inevitable destiny. According to the Neuchâtel
philosopher “anyone can settle anywhere, everyone needs to settle some-
where, within the harmonic framework of a community” (De Rougemont
1965, 20).
According to De Rougemont, the conditions of “reality,” “creation,” and
“meaning” stem from participation in the community and its cultural life.
“It is important to integrate within a group that is growing, to share its
spirit, and undergo a cultural naturalisation process” (ibid., 20–1). In
answer to the motto devenons nous-mêmes, Denis De Rougemont replies
restons nous-mêmes.
However, it seems that from the institutional point of view, the process
is plausibly unilateral while, as far as the “cultural” adjustment requirement
is concerned, the issue takes the shape of a potential cultural threat for the
foreigner. In his important texts, Habermas (1994; 1998) maintains that a
democratic State can legitimately expect only a political type of socialisa-
tion from immigrants, whereby they accept constitutional principles and
are willing to conform to the political culture of the host country, without
necessarily having to abandon the culture of their origins. Assimilation
where the immigrant is willing to adjust not only externally, but also to
absorb the mindset, habits, and local culture, would imply an ethical-
cultural integration that would affect the immigrants’ original identity
(Habermas 1994).
Surprisingly enough, also philosophers of law (Taylor 1994),
constructivist-social psychologists (Palmonari and Carugati 1988), and
cultural psychologists (Bruner 1990) agree that the recognition of “cultural”
groups is necessary to the definition of individual identity itself (cf. also
Iannaccone and Di Donato 2004, 313–5). The theoretical nucleus shared by
philosophy and psychology could be identified with the idea of culture as a
set of historical, cultural, and traditional values which shape an individual
11 The case is reported in Mahon 2003, 353. It is in this case that the Federal Court, in the
judgment quoted above, section 2 (Kohler 1937, 55), upheld on appeal.
288 Flora Di Donato and Pascal Mahon
© 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Ratio Juris, Vol. 22, No. 2
and his identity. This should not be framed within a process of unidirectional
influence, but in a context of interaction between culture and systems where
the individual is an “active” member of a specific community.
It is worth noting how philosophical and legal definitions sometimes
strongly overlap with psychological, sociological, and anthropological
ones. Bruner, for instance, one of the theorists of cultural psychology,
believes that “culture shapes the mind.” His position is supported by those
anthropologists who, like Clifford Geertz, radically think that, without the
instructive role of culture we would be useless monsters, undefined
animals that find completion and definition through culture (Geertz 1973;
1983). Palmonari and Carugati highlight the link between social and
personal identity, as investigated by social psychology. Social identity
“could be defined as whatever an individual is as a member of groups,
social categories, and different ethnic groups,” while personal identity “can
be considered as relating to the personal and intimate aspects of the
individual, which are paramount for feelings of autonomy and unique-
ness” (Palmonari and Carugati 1988, 522). From a political and philosophi-
cal perspective, Charles Taylor underlines that each individual constructs
his own identity by exchanging communication and values generated by
social practices and traditions that grow within real cultural contexts. If
identity is so ontologically structured, the disappearance of the original
cultural context or an inadequate evaluation in the wider social and
political context will also have negative consequences on individual iden-
tity. Taylor remarks that our identity is forged through a process of
recognition/non-recognition by other people. In fact non-recognition or
misrecognition can be harmful and represent a form of oppression that
traps a person in an unreal and impoverished way of life (Taylor 1994).
Taylor and the advocates of the recognition theory thus believe that
protecting the integrity of cultures is vital to the individual’s personal
fulfilment. Meyer-Bisch (1993, 23) recalls a definition by the Unesco Dec-
laration on the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation: “Cultures
are recognised as constitutive elements of peoples identity to the extent
that the very existence of peoples is at stake in their cultural development.”
Meyer-Bisch also highlights that the non-recognition of the rights he
defines as cultural threatens the very existence of the individual. This
phenomenon is particularly evident in people belonging to weaker groups,
such as immigrants.
Also from the philosophical and legal perspective, philosopher Axel
Honneth presents a theory of integration based on the importance of the
interpersonal recognition of the identity of the individual. The starting
point of Honnet’s theory of society is the principle which the social
psychologist Mead shared with the early Hegel. The core of this theory is
that the reproduction of social life necessarily depends on mutual recog-
nition. Indeed individuals can only relate to one another if they learn to see
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themselves from the normative perspective of their partners involved in
the interaction. Honneth’s theory considers that the construction of society
depends on processes taking place in the practical context of social life.
Conflicts between social groups generate a “collective effort” that can
generate forms of mutual recognition. In practice, it is a kind of normative-
oriented transformation of society (Honneth 1996).
In order to complete our analysis of the link between identity and
culture, it is interesting to remark that identity, traditionally studied and
defined only in the field of psychology or philosophy, has recently also
been defined in legal texts and contexts (Cavallo 1996). For instance, in Art.
8, par. 1 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child: “States Parties
undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including nationality, name, and family relations as recognized by law
without unlawful interference.”
The Article, whose principles are also incorporated into the Swiss legal
system, tends to give a “cultural” definition of identity, taking into account
the wider relational context from which the child comes. This means not
only family relationships, but also nationality, which is considered in terms
of belonging to a wider (geographic and probably ethnic) community. In
this respect, the philosopher Meyer-Bisch, in his project for a declaration on
cultural rights, defines cultural identity as “all the cultural references
through which a person or a group define and express themselves and
wish to be recognised” (Meyer-Bisch 1999, 12).
Simply, this overlapping of the “social and cultural construction of
the mind” (Carugati, Palmonari, and Bruner) and individual/collective
“recognition” (Taylor, Honneth) represents a constitutive element in the
formation and development of identity in multicultural contexts.
The relationship between the “right to citizenship” and the “recognition
of identity” can also be analysed, as Centlivres (1990a; 1990b) demon-
strates, from the ethnographic point of view. The naturalisation procedure
would appear to present, according to the ethnologist, the typical features
of the “rite of passage” (van Gennep 1960), which is symbolic and
institutional at the same time. Naturalisation represents a transition12
during which all the ritual elements seem to occur: “separation from the
country of origin during immigration; slow integration in the host country;
gradual association with the institutions of the host country” (Centlivres,
1990a).
12 Psychology itself, in its current interest in transitions, can contribute to the definition of this
“rite of passage.” According to scholars of transition psychology, Perret-Clermont and
Zittoun, this notion would enable the analysis of “periods of important change in life: Because
it changes or the field of activity changes, a person lives a sort of breaking off and has to adapt
to new situations. These changes generally imply that a person occupies a new place in the
social space, implying new roles, and that he or she acquires new knowledge and social,
cognitive, and pratical skills, redifining their identity and giving a meaning to the new givens
and the transition itself” (Perret-Clermont and Zittoun 2002, 12).
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Transition is reflected in the exercise of political rights by foreigners.
“Non-naturalised” persons have no right to vote at federal level. The right
to vote is recognised in only a few cantons and exclusively on matters
concerning the municipality or the canton itself, despite various plans to
revise their constitutions (also cf. Mahon and Pulver 2001, 198–233). Mahon
and Pulver claim that if we take into consideration (i) the distinction found
in various European countries between “citizenship” (intended as the right
to vote and be elected) and “nationality,” and (ii) the widespread phenom-
enon of the increasing mobility of the population, then there is no point in
subordinating the recognition of democratic rights to the acquisition of
“nationality”:
If one considers the democratic State first of all as a territorial State [. . .], the
“specific” link of nationality can become quite “artificial.” The persons subject to a
legislation must have the faculty to influence its contents in an indirect way by
electing the organs which adopt it, or directly by voting for the legislation itself.
(Mahon and Pulver 2001, 227)13
5. Conclusions
Complex realities like the Swiss case provide a real opportunity for
experimentation and observation of identity issues. Analysing phenomena
of this kind provides interesting indications and raises critical questions on
the actual impact that legislation can have. Looking beyond any interpre-
tation one may like to give of multicultural realities like the one we have
tried to describe, the problem remains of managing the multi-dimensional
complexity of cultural adjustment processes and the problematic (and
sometimes contradictory) issues of relevant legislation.
One of the questions still unanswered, raised by Habermas, is whether
a nation’s right to self-determination does not also include the right to
affirm its own identity. This could even go against immigrants if they
represent a “threat to the existing political-cultural form,” considering that,
inevitably, immigration modifies the social texture of the host society also
in ethical and cultural terms.
Meyer-Bisch holds the view that:
it is hardly thinkable that every People can find expression in one independent
State, and it is probably desirable that each be adequately represented within the
State organs of a nation or a confederation. But it is absolutely necessary that,
regardless of its size, its right to cultural self-determination be guaranteed (i.e., the
13 “[S]i l’on considère l’Etat démocratique d’abord comme un Etat territorial [. . .], le ‘lien
spécifique’ de la nationalité peut devenir assez ‘artificiel.’ Les personnes soumises à une
législation doivent avoir la faculté d’en influencer le contenu, de manière indirecte, par
l’élection des organes qui l’adoptent, ou de manière directe, par le vote de la législation
elle-même.”
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right to choose the way in which these very cultural rights must be recognised and
enforced). The determining cultural factor appears to be an essential component of
the essence of this right, which cannot be dispensed with. In other words, today
this right can be defined as the right to democracy. (Meyer-Bisch 1993, 41)
In the case of Switzerland, as Borghi remarks,
federalism, linked to the territorial distribution of its languages and the decentrali-
sation of the education system, is liable to become a cause of fragmentation and
waste of resources, bringing to the fore adverse mechanisms which hinder the
development of a truly intercultural society, without responding to the need to
protect minorities in a satisfactory way. (Borghi 1993, 250)
It may be argued that Swiss politics, in an attempt to prevent intercultural
crises, has actually had a restrictive effect on cultural rights.
Territoriality thus leads to the denial of diversity, which, though, is seen
as the very foundation of the national identity. Borghi remarks that from
an anthropological point of view this principle expresses “an often hys-
terical rejection of diversity, and leads to the repression of everything that
is not immediately recognisable as having primary affinities with the
dominant group” (ibid., 252).
Borghi believes that integration cannot be imposed by the dominant
culture “assimilating” immigrants and denying the dignity of their culture
in the name of an illusory and outdated uniformity, as this criterion fails to take
into account the population’s growing mobility, and takes a war-like and primitive
stand in order to defend the territory, which is based on an outdated proprietary
logic. (Ibid., 254)
It is a defensive, rigid concept, whose raison d’être is a closed, unchanging
uniformity, which can only generate intolerance and opposition.
However, asserting an individual, absolute right to cultural difference
would imply the risk of “atomisation.” According to Habermas (1994),
recognition should include all citizens, with their different cultural and
collective backgrounds within the polis, rather than protecting minority
cultures against interaction and change through contact with other cul-
tures. A community cannot take legal responsibility for all cultural com-
munities, but, conversely, rejection of differences cannot but lead to
cultural dominance and the exclusion of weaker individuals.
The alternative of either rejection or assimilation does not, therefore,
respect the cultural rights of immigrants. In conclusion, according to Borghi,
the respect for cultural rights in a multicultural context can only be achieved
through inclusion within the framework of a federal system supported by the
recognition of cultural rights as being human rights with a social content, which
may grant not only the right to abstention of the State in the private sphere, but
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also actions which may help promote the majority culture, at the same time
guaranteeing a minimum, and untouchable, level of cultural rights to all residents,
regardless of their affiliation to a recognised cultural community, but taking into
account the importance of these rights for the national community. (Borghi 1993,
261)
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